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"[A]llowing an inmate to 'create a kid who he's not going to be able to
father-is that what prisons are for?"' 1  Historically, the courts have
answered that question with a resounding "no."
Although the Supreme Court has ruled on several areas of prisoners'
rights, it has yet to review an inmate's claim for the right to procreate while
in prison.2 In 1990, the Eighth Circuit held, in Goodwin v. Turner, that the
right to procreate does not survive incarceration.' Recently, the Ninth
Circuit, in Gerber v. Hickman, ruled that an inmate serving a life term
sentence could artificially inseminate his wife while in prison.4 This is the
first court to fall on this side of the "prisoner's procreation right" debate.5
This comment examines what happened in the years between Goodwin
and Gerber and how the current Supreme Court should come down on this
controversial legal issue today. This comment will review the Supreme
Court's framework for analyzing prisoners' constitutional claims in Part I.
Part II outlines the lower courts' responses to inmates' requests for
procreation rights, including an overview of the Goodwin and Gerber
1. Bob Egelko, Court OKs Remote Fatherhood for Inmates, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6, 2001, at A3
(quoting Deputy Attorney General Gregory Walston's response to the holding in Gerber v. Hickman,
264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 273 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001)).
2. The Court has ruled on prisoners' rights in the areas of marriage, religion, discrimination,
and unreasonable searches. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (marriage); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972) (religion); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 33 (1968) (discrimination); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (searches).
3. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8thCir. 1990).
4. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 884. The court limited its holding, however, to the issue of the right
to procreate while incarcerated, and did not "conclude that a prisoner has a constitutional right 'to
mail his semen from prison so that his wife can be artificially inseminated,"' as the dissent
incorrectly stated. Id. at 888 n.6 (quoting Id. at 893 (Silverman, J., dissenting)).
5. Other courts beyond the Eighth Circuit in Goodwin that have addressed this issue have
looked at the problem surrounding conjugal visitation and its relation to procreation. See Hernandez
v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Rights of marital privacy, like the right to marry and
procreate, are necessarily and substantially abridged in a prison setting."); see also Southerland v.
Thigpen, 784 F.2d 713, 718 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the right to breast feed was outweighed by
legitimate penological goals of the state); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984)
(stating that although prisoners have no absolute constitutional right to visitation, restrictions on that
right must be "necessary to meet penological objectives"); Lynott v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340, 342
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that prison officials were justified in refusing to permit prisoners to visit
certain married women); Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 902 F. Supp. 765, 769-70 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (stating
that prisoners' right to association is not "absolute [or] unfettered" and that First Amendment rights
are, "necessarily curtailed by confinement"); Anderson v. Vasquez, 827 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that inmates condemned to death had no right to conjugal visits and that the prison
had no obligation to provide artificial insemination services), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 28 F.3d 104
(9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion); Wool v. Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Vt. 1981) (holding
that, "because plaintiff is incarcerated[,] his right to marry, if he has one, does not include the rights
of cohabitation, sexual intercourse, or procreation"); Percy v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 651 A.2d 1044
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding that a prisoner serving a life sentence had no constitutional
right to procreate by means of artificial insemination and that a restriction on artificial insemination
was related to legitimate penological interests). Criticism in Safley v. Turner was limited to the
prohibition on a prisoner's right to partake in a marriage ceremony. Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307
(8th Cir. 1985).
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opinions, which were based on the same analytical framework.6 Part III
examines the social shift in public perceptions about procreation and the
term "family." The traditional notions of family life faded in the last thirty
years of the nineteenth century and, ironically, society has urged science to
assist it in the area of reproductive technology in the hopes of creating a
family unit. In Part IV, this comment will analyze the current Supreme
Court and the jurisprudential factors that might weigh into the Court's ruling
if Gerber reaches the Court. Finally, Part V examines the legal, public, and
moral repercussions of the decision to extend reproductive rights to
prisoners.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS
A. Historical Analysis of the Court's Standard of Review Movement in
Analyzing Prison Regulations and Policies for Constitutionality
The Supreme Court stated that the "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution, 7 and that
"incarceration does not divest prisoners of all constitutional protections.
8
Historically, however, the Court has expressed three different perspectives
on how to determine which rights survive incarceration. Until 1960, courts
held the belief that prisoners practically lost all rights and that they were
essentially slaves of the state.9  Eventually, the courts recognized that
prisoners do retain some constitutional rights, but such rights were under the
authority and guidance of the legislative and administrative branches of the
government.'0 This approach has commonly been referred to as the "hands
off doctrine" and was premised on the concept that the courts lacked the
6. In both the Goodwin and Gerber opinions, the courts undertook the Turner analysis to decide
if procreation was a right that survived incarceration. See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1395; Gerber, 264
F.3d at 882.
7. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
8. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228 (2001).
9. Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoner's Rights, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1995, at 36,
36 (explaining that any rights a prisoner might have had were those rights which "the law in its
benignity accords to them, but not the rights of free men"); see also Todd M. Turner, Note,
Constitutional Law - Prisoners' Rights - Prison Regulation Denying Inmate the Right to Artificially
Inseminate Wife Held Constitutional. Goodwin v. Turner, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 671, 675
(1991) (explaining that prisoners were not afforded constitutional protections initially).
10. Call, supra note 9, at 36.
understanding, knowledge, and appreciation of the special nature of the
penological system."
Because of the changing political and social environment and attitude
towards the prison setting, the era of the uninvolved judiciary came to an
end in the 1960s. 12 Stories of the horrible treatment and conditions of prison
confinement combined with the activist attitude of the time resulted in a new
standard of review and perspective for the court system in relation to
prisoners' grievances. 13  At this time, the concept of "strict scrutiny"
emerged because, as the Court noted, a "policy of judicial restraint [with
respect to problems of prison administration] cannot encompass any failure
to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal
or state institution ... [and] federal courts will discharge their duty to protect
constitutional rights."'14  In an effort to establish a clear standard for
prisoners' rights claims, the Court outlined the strict scrutiny test in
Procunier v. Martinez.15 Generally, a regulation is constitutional if it
furthers an important or compelling state interest and the regulation's
limitation is no greater than necessary or essential to protect that interest.
16
Thus, the requirement that the means be "necessary" indicates that there
must not be any less restrictive way to achieve the government's interest.'
7
This is a high standard to prove and, consequently, most regulations do not
survive this test.' 8 As one commentator noted, the strict scrutiny era marked
a time that the Court not only recognized prisoners' retention of
constitutional rights, but also "view[ed] those rights as being nearly as
important as the legitimate needs of the prisons."' 9
In the late 1970s, the Court's opinions started to incorporate concepts of
the "hands off' era again.20 Specifically, in Turner v. Safley,21 the Supreme
Court rejected the strict scrutiny test in evaluating prison regulations because
it hampered the daily need for safety decisions at the administrative level
and, instead, the Court opted for a lower level of scrutiny.22 In Turner, the
11. Id.
12. Id. at 37.
13. Id. See also T. Joe Snodgrass, Note, Constitutional Law - a Call for Strict Scrutiny: Eighth
Circuit Denies Inmate's Request for Artificial Insemination - Goodwin v. Turner, 17 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 883, 889 (1991) (noting that "[o]ne commentator suggested that this retreat [from
the hands off doctrine] was in response to the abhorrent prison conditions").




18. Snodgrass, supra note 13, at 893 (stating that "an inmate's success in challenging a prison
regulation is conditioned upon application of the strict scrutiny standard of review").
19. Call, supra note 9, at 38.
20. Id. at 39.
21. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
22. Id. at 81-84.
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Court established that if there is a "prison regulation [which] impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, [then] the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interest[s]. 23 In essence, where there is
such a right, then we balance the right against the reasonableness of losing
that right for the benefit of penological interests.
In determining the reasonableness of the restriction, the Court will look
at a number of different factors. First, the Court will ask whether there is a
"'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it."'24 This connection cannot be
so tenuous such that the regulation is essentially "arbitrary or irrational.,
25
Second, the Court will evaluate if there is an "alternative means of
exercising the [asserted constitutional] right that remain[s] open to prison
inmates., 26 Next, the Court will measure the impact "on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of limited prison resources" if the asserted
constitutional right is accommodated. 27 Finally, the Court will look for an
alternative to the regulation and will evaluate if the regulation represents an
"'exaggerated response' to prison concerns." 28 Essentially, if there is an
available "alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at [a
minimal cost] to valid penological interests," then the regulation in question
is likely unreasonable. 29 According to Turner, a court should examine all of
the above four factors in an evaluation of the regulation's relationship to a
legitimate penological interest and look for a rational basis for the
restriction.3 °
The "rational basis" concept was clarified and reinforced in Thornburgh
v. Abbott, where the Court undertook an explanation of how prisoners' rights
cases should be determined.3t The Court cleared up the confusion created
23. Id. at 89.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 90.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 91.
30. The legitimacy, and the necessity, of considering the State's interests in prison safety and
security are well established by our cases. In Turner... and OLone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342 (1987), we held that the proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation
claimed to infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." This is true even when the constitutional
right claimed to have been infringed is fundamental, and the State under other circumstances would
have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 223 (1990) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89) (citations omitted).
31. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see also Snodgrass, supra note 13, at 895
by earlier cases concerning restrictions on constitutional rights which effect
both a prisoner and a free citizen and clearly stated that the standard of
review is the same rational basis test articulated in Turner.32 The Court
further explained that the only time that courts should apply the "strict
scrutiny" standard is when the restriction involves outgoing
correspondence.33 Thornburgh also clarified that the neutrality component
of the Turner reasonableness test is meant to ensure that the regulation in
question "'further[s] an important or substantial governmental interest
[which is] unrelated to the suppression of expression.' 3 4  The Court has
continued to clarify and solidify the importance of the Turner test and stated
in a recent opinion that it "reject[s] an alteration of the Turner analysis that
would entail additional federal-court oversight."35 Thus, the proper analysis
for determining the constitutionality of a regulation infringing on an
inmate's fundamental right is currently the Turner reasonableness standard.
B. Specific Rights That Have Been Retained or Denied
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided if the right to procreate
while in prison survives incarceration,36 the Court, using the above analysis,
has opined specifically on a few areas in which prisoners have retained their
rights as delineated in the Constitution. For example, inmates have the right
to be free from racial discrimination.37 The Court has also held that inmates
have a right to "due process," including a reasonable right of access to the
courts. " In the area of privacy,39 the Court has decided that the right to
(discussing the shift in constitutional claims analysis made by the Court).
32. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415.
33. Id. at 412.
34. Id. at 415 (quoting Procuier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
35. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223,230-31 (2001).
36. Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh 'g en banc granted, 273
F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001).
37. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (ruling that racial segregation in
prisons is unconstitutional other than for a very specific security need).
38. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (stating that prisoners "may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"); see generally Haines v. Kemer,
404 U.S. 519 (1972) (holding that an inmate must be allowed to present evidence in court regarding
a complaint involving the internal operations of the prison); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485
(1969) (ruling that inmates could assist one another in preparing and filing petitions for subsequent
court proceedings and habeas corpus relief and "it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the
courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed").
39. Privacy in the context of the constitutional right of free citizens has been firmly established
in many Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that
the fundamental right of privacy is implicit from the "penumbra" in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and that marriage is included in that right to privacy); see also Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (noting that marriage is of "fundamental importance" and "on the
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family
relationships"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that marriage is a fundamental right
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marry survives incarceration.4 ° Prisoners must also be provided "reasonable
opportunities" to exercise their religious freedom.41  Finally, the Eighth
Amendment ensures that they will not be subject to "cruel and unusual
punishments. ' 2
Whereas prisoners are generally afforded the same fundamental rights
prescribed in the Constitution as the general public, those rights are also
more limited in scope than those for the rest of society because of specific
penological objectives. 43  For example, the Court has been more restrictive
in the area of First Amendment protections and has granted prisoners the
right to only certain protections because of the various security concerns that
arise in the First Amendment context.44 In a Fourth Amendment context, the
prisoner's right to be free from unreasonable searches does not exist in his or
her prison cell because of the security interest of the prison administration. 5
Additionally, the Court has upheld state laws which limit an inmate's ability
or right to vote, and it has held that felons can be deprived of voting rights if
such laws are applied equally to all felons with the underlying interest of
preserving the integrity of the privilege to vote.46 Interestingly, all fifty
states have withheld conjugal visitation rights for death row inmates.47
and a liberty protected by the due process clause).
40. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (holding that Missouri's restrictions on inmate
marriages were unconstitutional).
41. See generally Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that a Buddhist
prisoner should be given equal opportunity to practice his faith as is granted to other prisoners
similarly situated); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (allowing prisoner to subscribe to religious
publications).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"); see, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976) (stating that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment).
43. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 227 (2001).
44. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (stating "a prison inmate retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system"). Thus, media interviews with individual inmates
are constitutional. Id. at 833-35. But see Turner, 482 U.S. at 93 (holding that restrictions on inmate-
to-inmate written correspondence are constitutional); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,
433 U.S. 119, 133 (1977) (ruling that a ban on the activities of a prisoner's labor union is
constitutional).
45. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
46. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Voting laws, which restrict pre-trial detainees
from voting, are not constitutional. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); see generally Bell v.
Wolfish 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (noting that the proper inquiry in deciding the constitutionality of
conditions imposed on a pre-trial detainee is whether the "conditions amount to punishment"
because, "under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication").
47. Valerie Richardson, 14 on Death Row Are Just Dying to Become Daddies, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1991, at A3. According to the California Code of Regulations, conjugal visitations or
C. Penological Interests
"Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system. 48  What are the various
penological considerations that guide the courts in weighing the Turner
factors? Traditionally, the courts have noted four underlying purposes
associated with imprisonment: "(1) the protection of society [through
incarceration], (2) the deterrence of crime ... , (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation, and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing., 49
Occasionally, a court will assert the goal of "cost efficiency" as a rationale
for restricting a prisoner's right.50
Such restrictions or retractions of a prisoner's right serve "as reminders
that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in
addition to correction." 51  In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court noted that the
death penalty serves three penological interests, including retribution,
"deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders," and "the
incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of
crimes that they may otherwise commit in the future. 52 Because of the
importance of the various penological interests in our society, courts give
prison officials deference regarding prison policies set to support the goals
of imprisonment.53
"family rights" are considered a privilege and are granted only when there is a minimal security
concern and a "bonafide and verified" family relationship. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3174 (2001).
48. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948); see also Jones, 433 U.S. at 133; Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
49. State v. Baker, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (Idaho 2001) (citing State v. Zaitseva, 13 P.3d 338 (Idaho
2000)); see also State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (Idaho 1992); State v. Toohill, 650 P.2d 707, 710
(Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
50. Snodgrass, supra note 13, at 908-09, 909 n.188 (listing three cases where a right was limited
based on the objective of keeping costs to a minimum).
51. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984).
52. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 & n.28 (1976) (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d
880, 896 (Cal. 1972)); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 685-86 (Mass. 1975). "A life
sentence without any possibility of parole serves the goals of incapacitation and retribution while
avoiding the risk of executing innocent people." David S. Friedman, The Supreme Court's Narrow
Majority to Narrow the Death Penalty, 28 HUM. RTS. 4, 5 (2001).
53. Kristin M. Davis, Inmates and Artificial Insemination: A New Perspective on Prisoners'
Residual Right to Procreate, 44 WASH. U. J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 163, 171 (1993).
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II. DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS WEIGH IN ON THE ISSUES
A. The Current Law Concerning Conjugal Visitation and Procreation in
Prison
Most states either strictly prohibit conjugal visitation, or severely limit
this contact while incarcerated, thereby naturally limiting the procreative
abilities of most prisoners.54 The rationale for denying conjugal visitation
has been described as the penological interest in "preserving institutional
order and discipline, maintaining security to protect against escape or
unauthorized entry, and achieving prisoner rehabilitation."5 Several states,
including California, have prohibited conjugal visits for inmates serving life
sentences without the chance of parole. 6 In New York, prisoners are
considered civilly dead if they are sentenced for life and cannot be married
or enter a marriage contract after they are incarcerated for life.57 New York
has also limited conjugal visitation for prisoners if they have AIDS because
the state has a substantial interest in preventing the spread of communicable
diseases.5 8 Legislative history in California reveals that the purpose of the
regulation regarding prohibited conjugal visitation for life-term inmates is to
promote "institutional security or public protection., 59 The decision to limit
such contact rights directly affects one's ability to procreate. 60  Thus,
limiting contact rights indirectly supports the penological interest of
deterrence and the state's interest in minimizing the financial burdens
54. Ronald L. Goldfarb & Linda R. Singer, Redressing Prisoner's Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 175,203 (1970).
55. Davis, supra note 53, at 171.
56. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3174(e)(2) (2001) (prohibiting family visits to inmates serving a
life sentence without parole or a parole date set); see also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79 (McKinney
2002) (stating that persons serving a life term sentence are deemed civilly dead and, thus, this statute
indirectly states that lifetime inmates are incapable of having conjugal visits); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-
5-1 (2001) (stating civilly dead inmates cannot be married); Dep't of Corr. v. Roseman, 390 So. 2d
394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (suggesting that a rule that prisoners cannot marry if they are serving
a sentence of twenty-five years or more before parole, are death row inmates, or are those who seek
to marry within the system is not constitutionally invalid).
57. Miner v. N.Y. Dep't ofCorr. Serv., 519 N.E.2d 301, 301-02 (N.Y. 1987).
58. Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536 (N.Y. 1987).
59. Prisoners: Conjugal Visits: Hearing on S.B. 1382 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 1992
Leg., Regular Sess. (Cal. 1992).
60. Hearing on A.B. 369 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2000 Leg., cmt. 1 (Cal.
2000) (stating that "serious effect[s] of inmate conjugal visits are the resulting pregnancies and
childbirths").
associated with running conjugal visitation programs and any resulting
medical or administrative costs.
6 1
Hypothetically, if the courts were to allow conjugal visitation for all
prisoners without limitation, then it is likely that the percentage of women
prisoners who would become pregnant as a result would increase
respectively. Most state correction systems require that a pregnant inmate
eventually make one of two choices: to abort or carry the baby to term and
then outplace the child with a relative or agency.62 The court in Pendergrass
v. Toombs held that a mother could not retain custody of her child while in
prison because the right to rear her child was "incompatible with
incarceration., 63 There is no place for a "family" in the prison setting.
64
A preamble to a penal code statute in California reveals that there is a
great number of female prisoners who are faced with family dilemmas either
as pregnant prisoners or as parents of children left with other people outside
the prison walls. 65 "Over one-half of the women in Califomia prisons have
minor children. As many as 6 percent of the women in jails and prisons are
pregnant at any given time. 66  This reality has led to case law and
legislation that attempt to prevent prisoners from increasing the size of their
families while incarcerated.67
Most states have been proactive in establishing procedures and systems
for caring for children conceived by prisoners. In Florida, a statute
specifically states that "[t]he department shall provide for the care of any
child so born and shall pay for the child's care until the child is suitably
placed outside the prison system.
61
Traditionally, courts within the Ninth Circuit have ruled that prisoners'
rights are necessarily curtailed "in order to accommodate the innumerable
'institutional needs and objectives' of the prison. 69 In Anderson v. Vasquez,
a district court case out of Califomia prior to Gerber, the court specifically
stated that there is no constitutional right to have an inmate's sperm
preserved for insemination because such a right would be inconsistent with
61. Id. (explaining that the undesirable result of conjugal visitation pregnancies is an increased
cost to society in addition to the existing burden of housing a parent that should be punished).
62. FLA. STAT. ch. 944.24 (2002); Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326, 342 n.22 (3d Cir. 1987) (asserting that the cost of providing an abortion is less than the
cost of carrying a child to full term).
63. Pendergrass v. Toombs, 546 P.2d 1103, 1103 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
64. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 342 n.22.
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174(a) (West 2001).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. FLA. STAT. ch. 944.24 (2002).
69. Anderson v. Vasquez, 827 F. Supp. 617, 620 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)).
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"legitimate penological objectives."70 Until Gerber, the Ninth Circuit was
fairly consistent with its application of the Turner test and gave deference to
the penological needs asserted by the state.
A majority of the courts that have faced similar questions regarding a
prisoner's right to procreate have found that such a fight, if it exists at all, is
extremely limited. For instance, the Hernandez v. Coughlin opinion from
the Second Circuit stated, "inmates possess the right to maintain their
procreative abilities for later use once released from custody, even though
this right is restricted."'71 Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit, in Poe v. Gerstein,
the court stated that the taxpayers should not be responsible for guaranteeing
a procreative opportunity, thereby expressing that the state's interest in being
cost efficient in the allocation of resources is determinative in deciding such
issues.72 In Oregon, a court held that "[t]he exercise of certain constitutional
rights is incompatible with incarceration" and that "[o]ne of those
incompatible rights is the right to rear children., 73  A Wisconsin court
rejected the notion of a prisoner's claimed right to procreate because of the
very limited physical nature of incarceration.74
A New Jersey court held that a prison's policy against artificial
insemination was valid and that the penological interests put forth by the
state, including "[s]ecurity risks, scarce resources[,] and equal protection
concerns," as well as potential economic concerns, were sufficient to give
such deference to the prison officials. 75 Also, in the Fourth Circuit, in
dictum, the court denied the fight to marry and, indirectly, the right to
procreate.76 Finally, there are a few unpublished opinions stating that the
right to procreate while incarcerated is questionable and likely not a
constitutional guarantee.77
70. Id. at 620-21 (relying on the analysis in Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (W.D.
Mo. 1988), affd, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984)).
71. Hemandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136-37 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
72. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975).
73. Pendergrass v. Toombs, 546 P.2d 1103, 1103 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
74. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 209 (Wis. 2001) (claiming that "incarceration, by its very
nature, deprives a convicted individual of the fundamental right to be free from physical restraint...
[and] the right to procreate").
75. Percy v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 651 A.2d 1044, 1047 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding
that a male prisoner serving a life term could not artificially inseminate his wife from prison).
76. Holland v. Hutto, 450 F. Supp. 194 (W.D. Va. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1979).
77. E.g., Vaughn v. Hvass, No. C4-99-2184, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 554, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 6, 2000) (stating that "the right of procreation is inconsistent with [one's] status as a prisoner
because conjugal visitation is not constitutionally guaranteed"); see also Anderson v. Vasquez, No.
92-16631, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17200, at *6 (9th Cir. July 13, 1994) (pointing towards the fact
B. An Overview of the Analysis in Goodwin
Steven Goodwin was an inmate serving a fourteen-year sentence for
drug offenses, and he desired to artificially inseminate his wife from prison
in Missouri. 78 His wife was thirty years old at the time of trial and the
couple feared that, at the date of his eventual release, she would be
biologically beyond her ability to safely conceive.79 The couple informed
officials that they would bear all financial burdens associated with the
extraction procedure. 80  The district court in Goodwin quoted the case of
Southerland v. Thigpen, in which a female inmate could not breast feed her
child, 8' stating "'the considerations that underlie our penal system justify the
separation of prisoners from their spouses and children,"' and, thus, the
court found that artificial insemination, like conjugal visitation, is outside
the "reasonable contours" of an inmate's protected rights, and, thus, there
was no need to engage in a Turner analysis.82
At the appellate court level, the court did not discuss whether or not the
right to procreate survived incarceration and, instead, it engaged in an
analysis regarding the reasonableness of limiting a prisoner's right to
procreate in relation to any penological interest.83 A basic tenet that courts
hold in this type of analysis is that "incarceration necessarily deprives an
individual of the freedom 'to be with family and friends and to form the
other enduring attachments of normal life."' 84  The majority opinion
rationalized that the Bureau's prohibition on inmate procreation was
rationally related to the interest of treating male and female inmates equally
to the greatest extent possible. Thus, if the prison treated male and female
inmates similarly, there would be a significant impact on allocation of prison
resources that are necessary and important for prison programs and security.
This was the court's main rationale for holding that such a right, when
balanced against the needs of the institution, was not necessary.86
that the Supreme Court, "[i]n listing the 'attributes' of marriage which survive incarceration ...
notably declined to mention the right to procreate").
78. Turner, supra note 9, at 671.
79. Id.
80. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1397 (8th Cir. 1990).
81. Southerland v. Thigpen, 784 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1986).
82. Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (quoting Southerland, 784
F.2d at 716), aft'd, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
83. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1398.
84. Id. at 1399 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
85. Id. at 1400.
86. Id.
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The court also addressed the lack of an alternative solution and stated
that it "stem[med] from the fact that none [could] exist without
compromising prison policy or expending a large amount of prison
resources" for accommodation.87 Additionally, it would have had a
significant impact on other prisoners because of the impact on resource
allocation if the court had allowed this right to stand.88
In his dissent, Judge McMillian noted that Goodwin's request was a
minimal burden (clean container and a means to swiftly transport container
to wife outside) compared to the importance of the fundamental right to
procreate. 89 Judge McMillian stated that the majority incorrectly applied the
Turner test and so he partook in his own Turner analysis and concluded that
the right to procreate should survive incarceration.9"
Under the first test of Turner, he claimed that the court should evaluate
if the right to procreate survives incarceration. 9' Judge McMillian pointed
out that the right to marry survives incarceration 92 because the court held
that marriage and procreation are fundamental to the survival of the race and
the stability and progress of our society are enhanced when they occur
together.93 Thus, he reasoned, the right to procreate should also survive
incarceration.94 He bolstered this argument with the concepts found in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, a Supreme Court case regarding mandatory
sterilization. 95 He argued that, in Skinner, sterilization was found to be
unconstitutional and, thus, to avoid sterilization upon incarceration we must
allow the right to procreate to survive imprisonment. 96 Finally, the dissent
argued that, in Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v.
Lanzaro,97 the Third Circuit held that the right to elect abortion survives




89. Id. at 1401 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1407.
91. Id. at 1401.
92. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 78 (1987).
93. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1402.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
96. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1403 (claiming that "if the right [to procreate] did not survive
incarceration, states would presumably be free to take away the capacity to procreate upon
incarceration, which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Skinner").
97. 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987).
98. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1403.
After satisfying the first test of Turner, Judge McMillian focused on
step two-the reasonableness test-which includes an analysis of four
factors to determine if a regulation is reasonable. 99 The first factor calls for
a rational and valid connection between the contested regulation and "'the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it."1 00 It is important
that the underlying objective put forward is neutral and legitimate, and the
regulation must be rationally related to that governmental objective. °1 The
dissent recognized that the interest put forward by the state was that of
treating the inmates equally; however, Judge McMillian argued that, even
though this interest is neutral, it is not legitimate when it is "accomplished at
the expense of denying the exercise of an otherwise accommodatable
constitutional right."'' 0 2 He also claimed that the desire to treat inmates
equally is irrationally connected to the refusal of this constitutional right.' °3
Thus, the dissent concluded that the first prong of the second Turner test
failed.
10 4
Next, Judge McMillian looked to the second potential factor for
upholding the restriction. 1°5 He concluded that the majority was correct in
asserting that there are no alternative means of exercising that right which
remains open to the prisoners.10 6
Next, Judge McMillian examined the impact of accommodation on
others, such as the guards and inmates, and the impact on the allocation of
resources generally, and he found that the majority incorrectly applied this
third prong by examining the impact as if the right were available to all
inmates.'0 7 The dissent suggested that accommodating the procreation right
in this case did not necessarily mean it would be accommodated in
another. 10 8  Thus, Judge McMillian concluded that any impact from
accommodating Goodwin was de minimis, and the regulation did not survive
the third prong of the Turner test.109
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority for neglecting to analyze the
fourth Turner factor, which calls for an examination of the possibility of a
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
101. Id. at 1404.
102. Id. at 1405.
103. Id. (asserting that "[p]risons are often required to accommodate the exercise of a particular
right in some circumstances and, because of different security or administrative burdens, permitted
to deny it in others").
104. id.
105. Id. at 1405-06.
106. Id. at 1406.
107. Id. (limiting his discussion of whether the right survives incarceration to male inmates only
because "[c]ourts have recognized that different treatment of male and female inmates does not
necessarily offend equal protection").
108. Id.
109. Id.
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"ready alternative."1 °  A ready alternative would illustrate that the
restriction on the constitutional right was unreasonable. 1 ' Judge McMillian
asserted that there were at least two alternatives that existed to the
challenged regulation and both accommodations allowed for a potential
limitation on the procreative right to some. 112 Thus, he concluded, because
three of the four Turner factors were inapplicable, this regulation was "an
exaggerated response not reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."" 3 This case provoked a strong dissent and stirred a motion for a
rehearing en banc, but that request was denied. 14 Therefore, the proposition
that the right to procreate does not survive incarceration, as explained in
Goodwin, remains the law in the Eighth Circuit.
C. An Overview of the Analysis in Gerber
The facts in Gerber slightly differ from those in Goodwin. William
Gerber was an inmate sentenced to life in prison and, thus, was denied
conjugal visitation privileges with his forty-six-year-old wife." 5 Gerber was
convicted of discharging firearms and making terrorist threats, and, because
he had two prior convictions, his sentence was enhanced by eleven
additional years. 16 The couple was also willing to bear the financial burden
of an insemination procedure. 117
The district court denied Gerber the ability to participate in the artificial
insemination procedure based on the rationale as outlined in the circuit
opinion in the Goodwin case." 8 When the case went on appeal to the circuit
court, the majority reversed the district court after walking through the
Turner analysis as laid out in the circuit dissent in Goodwin." 9 The majority
110. Id. at 1407.
111. Id.
112. Id. (suggesting that the prison administration review each case individually for approval, or
that the administration deny the right to any request which would unduly burden the prison security,
administration, and allocation of resources).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1395.
115. Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §
3174(e)(2) (2002)), vacated, reh 'g en banc granted, 273 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001).
116. Id. at 884.
117. Id.
118. Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216-18 (E.D. Cal. 2000), rev'd, vacated,
remanded 264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc granted 273 F.3d 843 (9th Cir.
2001).
119. Gerber, 264 F.3d at 882. Although this opinion has been vacated for the pending en banc
hearing and opinion, this comment focuses on the analysis conducted in arriving at the court's
107
started with the proposition that the right to procreate is a fundamental right
based on the precedent of Skinner and Turner.2 ° Then, the court used only
the first Turner factor to determine if the restriction on that right was
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.'2 '
The regulation did not reasonably relate to the three penological
objectives asserted by the Warden because there was no valid, rational
connection between these objectives and the restriction on Gerber's right. 122
One of the stated objectives of the corrections system-the policy of treating
men and women prisoners the same-was rejected as a legitimate interest
that was not implicated. 123 The court's reasoning was that male and female
prisoners are treated the same insofar as they are "not similarly situated.'
124
The next objective that the Warden sought to uphold was the security of
others, and the court held that there were no safety risks in collecting
Gerber's semen as indicated by the evidence on the record. 25 Finally, the
Warden raised the issue of the cost of litigation related to the procedure or if
others were denied the opportunity to participate also. 126 The court strongly
insisted that it is "simply impermissible to restrict the constitutional rights of
one group because of fear that another group will assert its constitutionally
protected rights as well"'127 and that it is "generally reprehensible to suggest
that restricting protected fundamental constitutional rights is justified by fear
of increasing a party's liability."'' 2 8  Ultimately, the court rejected the
argument that there was a valid connection between the three stated
penological concerns and the restriction on Gerber's right. 29 Ironically, the
same penological interest was advanced in Gerber that was advanced in
original holding.
120. Id. The court based its reasoning on the rationale of Skinner and Turner taken together to
conclude that the right to procreate survives incarceration. Id. at 889. Skinner preserved the right to
procreate following incarceration and Turner stood as an example of how "right[s] related to
marriage and family may be exercised in prison despite a prisoner's inability to carry out the
'typical' marriage while in prison." Id. These cases suggest that the right to procreate might be
available to inmates. Id.
121. Id.at882.
122. Id. at 890. The warden claimed that there were three penological reasons for restricting
Gerber's right to procreate. Id. The three interests were: to observe the "policy of treating men and
women prisoners the same, when possible; safety risks caused by prisoners collecting semen; and
concerns about the cost of litigation relating to the procedure." Id.
123. Id.at891.
124. Id. (stating that "[w]omen cannot avail themselves of the opportunity Gerber narrowly
seeks-to provide a semen specimen to his mate so that she can be artificially inseminated").
125. Id. The warden was concerned that inmates could partake in gassing ("throwing their bodily
fluids on others") or sending their semen in the mail to unsuspecting individuals. Id. The court
stated that this is an issue for remand at the district court level, however, as the evidence stands, this
does not seem to be a concern. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 891-92.
129. Id.
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Goodwin, namely that there is a policy of treating male and female prisoners
the same. However, each court came to a different conclusion on the
validity of its relation to the restriction.
Like Goodwin, the dissent in Gerber was equally scathing. Judge
Silverman gawked at the result of the opinion, which essentially granted "an
inmate serving a life sentence ... a constitutional right to mail his semen
from prison."'' 30  The dissent argued that Skinner and Turner do not
collectively suggest that the right to procreate is one that prisoners retain
while in prison.131 "Common sense also suggests that procreation is
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.' 32 Judge Silverman argued
that the district court was correct and that the right to procreate is not
available while in prison, and, thus, the Turner analysis was entirely
unnecessary. 1
33
III. THE SOCIAL SHIFT AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
A. A Historical Perspective on the Family Unit and Procreation Rights
Since before America's founding as a nation, the traditional family unit
resembled a property agreement whereby the man possessed both his wife
and children.134 "The marital status thus created was one that conferred
virtually all legal rights upon the husband, who became the head of the
newly established household."' 135 The idea that a woman had equal rights to
an identity and a voice did not come into question until the mid 1800s, when
women started to reject the idea that they had no influence in where their
families would live or to whom their property would pass upon their
deaths. 136  Emerging social perspective and dogma of an era is usually
reflected in the more controversial court opinions and state laws, and true
legal change often takes years of debate and struggle. 37 It took seventy-two
130. Id. at 893 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 894.
133. Id.
134. Henna Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women 's Rights
and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2017, 2021 n.8
(2000); see also Judge Phyllis W. Beck, The Metamorphosis of the Family, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REv. 251 (1998) (noting that children were considered property).
135. Kay, supra note 134, at 2021.
136. Id.at2021-22&nn.l-13.
137. Id. at 2091 ("Law typically follows, rather than leads, social change."). For example, "in the
years of social reform and debate before our government granted women the
right to vote. 38 In the early stages of the twentieth century, prior to winning
the right to vote, married women began to sense that they had more
autonomy and individualism because of changes in divorce and property
laws. However, the majority of women believed their primary responsibility
was rearing their children and attending to the needs of the family.139 With a
new brand of equality, women and men began to slowly understand the
concept of family structure with a new perspective, and, by the mid 1900s,
women were not only working outside the home, but were also demanding
equal pay and sharing child rearing responsibilities with the man.
40
Ironically, it was about this same time in history that women asked for the
right to control their reproductive lives, and the 1960s ushered in a new host
of social questions and family changes related to marriage and
procreation. 141
Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, there was essentially only
one known way to reproduce biologically, and legal restrictions on
reproduction historically have been limited to the context of heterosexual
married couples. 42 Laws in several states previously limited intercourse to
married individuals and, therefore, confined the question of procreation to
that of the marital relationship. 143 However, in recent times, the Supreme
Court and other state courts have been called upon to answer questions
involving homosexual "unions," contraception, abortion, frozen embryos,
1840s, state legislatures began to enact the Married Women's Property Acts designed to eliminate or
modify the harsh common law doctrines affecting the legal status of married women" despite the
popular opinion at the time. Id. at 2022. Another example is seen "during the early 1900s, [when]
social reformers advocated eugenic sterilization as a solution to problems such as mental retardation.
Thirty states enacted statutes authorizing compulsory eugenic sterilization. Eugenic sterilization
theories have since been largely discredited and many states have repealed their statutes." In re
Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1990).
138. Kay, supra note 134, at 2024; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (stating that the right to vote
"shall not be denied ... on the account of sex").
139. Kay, supra note 134, at 2032-33. It was around this time that the common law marriage
scheme began to dissolve because the underlying rationale-that early pioneers did not have access
to ministers who could officiate a formal ceremony-was a dying reality and socially undesirable.
Id. at 2037.
140. Id. at 2040-48 (noting that women constituted 57% of the workforce in 1945, that in 1963
Congress passed the Equal Pay Act, and that the divorce rate increased almost 20% in the first fifty
years of the twentieth century).
141. Id. at 2048 (explaining that "[tihe period of the 1960s was one of extraordinary social and
political ferment in the United States" and citing the approval of the first birth control pill as an
example of the type of social change).
142. Monique Vinet Imbert, The Golden Egg: In Vitro Fertilization Produces Adjudication, 17
RUTGEIkS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 495, 496-97 (1991) (citing the birth of the first test tube baby,
Louise Brown, in 1978 as the first successful alternative means of reproduction).
143. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 9 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 n.5 (1983) (citing the laws in Massachusetts and New York,
which prohibit fornication and label it as a criminal offense or misdemeanor).
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and sterilization. 44 The issues specifically surrounding the procreative right
continue to be complicated and socially delicate. As the technology in this
area continues to evolve, and the American attitude towards privacy and
independence grows deeper, the courts will eventually have to answer the
tougher social and policy issues related to such bioethical questions., 45
B. Reproductive Technology
It was not until the late 1970s that the American legal community began
to examine the complexities involved with the quickly evolving scientific
advances in reproductive technologies. 146 Today, we face questions not only
about inmates seeking reproductive rights, but also free citizens who wish to
clone themselves or their spouses. 47  The area of assisted reproductive
technology generally covers reproduction by in vitro fertilization (IVF),
artificial insemination, surrogacy, and cloning. 48 An Assisted Reproductive
144. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (overturning a Texas criminal abortion law declaring
it unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding a state law forbidding
contraceptive use unconstitutional); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding a state
Mandatory Sterilization of Inmates Act unconstitutional); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)
(upholding a state sterilization law stating that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough"); Baehr
v. Mike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (dismissing a lower court appeal because of a 1998 state
constitution amendment adopted by the voters, which essentially created a reciprocal beneficiary
status for homosexual couples); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (awarding the ex-
husband the right to decline further use of the frozen embryos after his divorce).
145. See also Judith F. Daar, Frozen Embryo Disputes Revisited: A Trilogy of Procreation
Avoidance Approaches, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 197, 197 (2001) (noting that it is not surprising that
courts are becoming arbiters of reproductive disputes in a society where there are over 100,000
frozen embryos in storage in the United States and that the divorce rate is close to 40-50%). See
generally Kay, supra note 134, at 2092 (stating that "[a]s a nation we have placed great value on
independence and privacy").
146. The first legal publications reviewing the topic of reproductive technologies were published
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See Paul J. Dostart, Taxation of Embryo Transplants: The Land of
Milk and Money, 36 TAX LAW. 61 (1982); Kelly L. Frey, New Reproductive Technologies: The
Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REv. 303, 322 (1982); Laurelle H. Kinney, Legal Issues
of the New Reproductive Technologies, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 514 (1977); Barbara Kritchevsky, The
Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family,
4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981); Robertson, supra note 143.
147. "Over the past decades, we have observed the law constantly playing catch-up to science in
the areas of computer technology, digital music, electronic communications, stem cell research,
[and] human cloning." Glendora Hughes, Genetically Incorrect, 35 MD. B.J. 34, 34 (2002). See
generally Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human
Cloning, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 643 (1998) (outlining the history of human cloning and related laws).
148. See 1999 Annual Report Definitions for the CDC's Division of Reproductive Health, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/ART99/appixb.htm. The Center for Disease Control defines
assisted reproductive technology (ART) as: "All treatments or procedures that involve surgically
removing eggs from a woman's ovaries and combining the eggs with sperm to help a woman
become pregnant. The types of ART are in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and
Technology Report released in January 2002 reported that in 1999,
approximately 30,200 infants were born as a result of this type of technology
compared to 28,000 infants in 1998.149  Due to the increasing rates in
assisted reproduction births, it is important that our nation re-examine the
public policy and consequences of this technology not only for our society
as a whole, but also because of the implications on the prison population.15
IV. THE SUPREME COURT TODAY AND A PREDICTION FOR TOMORROW
A. The Supreme Court's Perspective on Inmate Marriages and Procreation:
Should the Right to Procreate While in Prison Survive Incarceration?
The Supreme Court has created a clear body of law surrounding a free
citizen's right to marry and procreate based on the concept of the right to
privacy in fundamental matters, which is essentially the right to make
decisions about highly private matters. 5 Specifically, the Court has stated
that marriage is of "fundamental importance" and on the same level of
importance as "decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing,
and family relationships."'' 52 However, in making that sweeping statement,
the Court put parameters around its concept of marriage and child rearing by
stating, "a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family setting
must receive equivalent protection and, if [the] right to procreate means
anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in
which the [s]tate ... allows sexual relations legally to take place." '53 It was
in 1987, under the Turner opinion, that the Court validated a prisoner's
limited right to marry and stated that the "right to marry, like many other
zygote intrafallopian transfer." id. See also Cloning of Human Embryo Sparks Debate,
BIOVENTURE VIEW, Nov. 27, 2000, at I (noting that a privately held medical group has "created the
first cloned human embryo").
149. See CDC's 1999 Annual Reproductive Health Survey, at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/
ART99/99nation.htm.
150. One judge referred to the changing dynamics of the American family as creating a "fluidity
and fragility in the picture," which "raises problems for the children of today." Beck, supra note
134, at 252. Children in today's families "cannot be certain the same adults will sustain them
psychologically or economically as they grow. They cannot be certain that both a female and male
will be available to them. They cannot be certain that they will lead geographically stable lives ...
[generally they] face greater uncertainty." Id. The uncertainty that Judge Beck discussed does not
necessarily involve the children of inmates, but one can imagine that the impact on those children
will be equally as difficult, if not more confusing.
151. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (outlining the concept of the right to privacy
and its implication on fundamental rights). "[T]he Court has recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In
varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right
[in various amendments and the Bill of Rights]." Id.
152. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
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rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration.', 154
The majority opinion in Turner was written by Justice O'Connor and joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens1 5 and Scalia-four of the
current justices 15 6-which suggests that today's Court would still hold that
prisoners' marriages are limited by the mere fact of incarceration.
One such limitation that the Court is likely to uphold is the limit on
conjugal visitations, based on its language in Turner'17 and the denial of
certiorari in several cases that specifically addressed appeals from prisoners
claiming that the denial of the right to have conjugal visits is a constitutional
violation.158  The Court has stated explicitly that "most inmates eventually
will be released ... and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the
expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated," thus indicating
that it is not concerned with an inmate's right to consummate a marriage
while in prison.'59 The Court was not hesitant to specify the limits of a
prisoner's right to privacy matters in the context of marriage, and, in listing
the "incidents of marriage" that are unaffected by incarceration, the Court
specifically omitted the right to participate in conjugal visits or to procreate
while in prison.
160
Skinner is the only case that the Court has adjudicated which
specifically concemed prisoners and procreation.'16  Skinner involved
prisoner sterilization, which was a negative policy affecting the post-
incarceration rights of an inmate. 162  Ultimately, the Court held that a
prisoner has a fundamental right to procreate following incarceration, thus
154. Turner v. Saffley, 482 U.S. 78, 94 (1987).
155. Stevens dissented in part because he disagreed with the manner in which the majority
analyzed the two different regulations at issue in this suit and claimed that the majority should not
have used such an "open-ended 'reasonableness' standard." Id. at 101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 80.
157. Id. at 96 ("Most inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore
most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully
consummated.").
158. Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the "right to marital
privacy and conjugal visits while incarcerated is not" constitutionally protected); see also Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) ("That there is a valid, rational connection between a ban on
contact visits and internal security of a detention facility is too obvious to warrant extended
discussion."); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding prisoners have no
right to contact visits); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating prison inmates
have "no absolute constitutional right" to conjugal visits).
159. Turner, 482 U.S. at 96.
160. Id.
161. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
162. Id. at 536-37.
his ability to do so may not be destroyed. 163 The result of this opinion has
been construed in two different ways by two different circuit courts.1 64 One
side stated that Skinner implies that procreation during prison is a protected
right, and the other side argued that this holding only protects the ability to
procreate post-incarceration.1 65  If the Court intended that the Skinner
holding extend only to the protection of the right "post-incarceration," then
the impact would be very different for prisoners sentenced to life in prison
because there is no post-incarceration period for these prisoners.
In a summary affirmance, the Court affirmed the judgment of a lower
court that stood for the proposition that inmates serving life sentences were
prohibited from marrying. 166 Thus, if a court subscribes to the belief that
Skinner reserved the right to procreate during incarceration, it binds life term
prisoners, who have no conjugal visitation or martial rights, to procreating
specifically via assisted reproductive technology. 67 However, it is illogical
to assume that, because an inmate has a privacy interest in marriage or a
preserved right to procreate, the government should affirmatively assist in
achieving reproduction. One goes too far to say that the government has "an
affirmative duty... to provide facilities for conjugal visits or the means to
assist in artificial insemination," especially for an activity that does not
subject the prisoner to a "'fate forbidden by the principle of civilized
treatment guaranteed"' by the Constitution.'68
The Court has held that prisoners have a limited right to marry, which
does not include the normal privileges associated with marriage, and the
right to procreate has only been extended specifically to prisoners upon their
163. Id. at 536.
164. Compare Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc
granted, 273 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001), with Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (W.D. Mo.
1988), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
165. Compare Gerber, 264 F.3d at 888-89 (holding that the right to procreate survives
incarceration), with Goodwin, 702 F. Supp. at 1454 (holding that a prohibition on procreation while
incarcerated was reasonable).
166. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953, 953 (1974), aff'g Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
167. See, e.g., Wool v. Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928 (D.C. Vt. 1981) (denying an inmate sentenced to
ten years conjugal visitation rights and the right to marry the mother of his child). "But because
plaintiff is incarcerated his right to marry, if he has one, does not include the rights of cohabitation,
sexual intercourse, or procreation." Id. at 932. See also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79a (McKinney
2002) (instructing that inmates are deemed "civilly dead" if they are sentenced to life).
168. Goodwin, 702 F. Supp. at 1454 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958)) (noting that
the prison "neither is nor should be responsible for guaranteeing procreative opportunity"). The
court in Goodwin supported this statement by citing Bell v. Wolfish, where the Supreme Court held
that a .' [l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement."' Id. at 1454
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)). Additionally, the court relied on a Fifth Circuit
opinion where the court denied an inmate mother the right to breastfeed her baby because "'the
considerations that underlie our penal system justify the separation of prisoners from their spouses
and children and necessitate the curtailment of many parental rights that otherwise would be
protected."' Id. at 1455 (quoting Southerland v. Thigpen, 784 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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release. Thus, there is no fundamental right to procreate while incarcerated,
particularly through affirmative measures such as artificial insemination.
B. In the Unlikely Event the Supreme Court Finds That There Is a
Fundamental Right to Procreate by Assisted Reproduction Technology
While in Prison, Is Such a Right Legitimately Restricted by a
Penological Interest?
If the Supreme Court were to hold that the right to procreate via
reproductive technology while imprisoned survives incarceration, then the
next prong of the Turner test requires that there be a "valid, rational
connection" between the regulation that restricts the fundamental right and a
legitimate and neutral governmental interest. 169 The penological interests of
security, deterrence/retribution, and resource conservation are frequently
referenced as legitimate interests in establishing a regulation of a prisoner's
right. 170 In assessing whether there are valid penological concerns to the
prison system in regulating assisted reproduction in prison, it is important to
explore some of the issues that would arise if artificial insemination
procedures were allowed in the prison context.
First, allowing this procreative right would pose safety hazards. In
Thornburgh, the Court noted that if there were any issue that "concerns the
entry of materials into the prison," the prison authorities would have broad
discretion in regulating the entry of such materials because of the inherent
safety concerns.1 If reproductive technology were used to achieve
procreation in prison, then the prison would be faced with administering the
transfer of empty receptacles or containers full of genetic material every
time a prisoner sought to exercise his or her right to procreate. Additionally,
an extraction of a female prisoner's egg requires a doctor and a surgical
procedure, which automatically introduces more complex security concerns
and costs. 17 2 Thus, the entry of this material increases security concerns
related to whether or not the material is truly what it is supposed to be or if it
is some other hazardous material.
169. Turnerv. Saffley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
170. See discussion supra Part I.C.
171. Thornburghv. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,416 (1989).
172. Dorothy E. Mitchell-Leef, What Happens at Egg Retrieval? (1996), at http://www.surrogacy.
com/medres/article/eggretrv.html (explaining that a female must undergo a full course of "ovulation
induction medications" and then is administered sedation, and then undergoes an operation to
remove the egg from the vagina).
Additional concerns include prisoners' abuse of the opportunity to
"share" their genetic material. A prisoner's ability to "gas" other inmates or
guards, or to send sperm through the mail system to people who are not
expecting or desiring a prisoner's genetic material will cause harm to
others. 17
3
Next, there is the concern about the allocation of scarce resources and
that the right to procreate via reproductive technology would be a significant
drain on those resources because of the increased costs of administering the
right to all inmates who desire to exercise this supposed right. 74 The state
prisons will incur higher costs for additional medical staff and administrators
as well as the expenses associated with paying for indigent prisoners who
seek to exercise the same rights, or potentially for establishing a program to
eradicate health concerns raised by the spread of disease to an unborn
child. 75  The overall increased costs of medical services for women alone
would seem a burden that the prison system should not have to bear in light
of the other social and penological interests involved. 76  "Providing
resources and accommodations for procreation to some inmates would likely
reduce the availability of other desirable programs for all inmates.' 77
There is also an alternative means of exercising the asserted
constitutional right, which lends credibility to the fact that a regulation
prohibiting artificial insemination in the prison setting is not an exaggerated
response. Prisoners who desire to be parents have the option of adoption.
Adoption is available both domestically and internationally, and the adoptive
parents 78 receive tax credits for participating in an adoption procedure. 171
173. Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax Prisons Based upon Alleged Gang
Affiliations: A Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a Proposal for Greater Procedural
Requirements, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1115, 1125 (1995) (noting that "inmates have thrown their feces or
urine on correctional officers, an act known as 'gassing').
174. See Judy Licht, Frozen in Time: Storing of Embryos Boosts the Chances of Pregnancy-and
Raises Ethical Questions, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at Z10 (explaining that the cost of extraction
and implantation of one fresh embryo is $10,000).
175. Jacqueline B. DeOliveira, Marriage, Procreation and the Prisoner: Should Reproductive
Alternatives Survive During Incarceration?, 5 TOuRO L. REV. 189, 205 (1988) (commenting on the
concern of providing monetary support for spouses and children of indigent prisoners); see also
Luigi Brandimarte, Sperm Plus Egg Equals One "Boiled" Debate: Kass v. Kass and the Fate of the
Frozen Pre-Zygotes, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 767, 767 (2000) (discussing the high costs
associated with reproductive technologies). This comment is limited to discussing the potential
repercussions of allowing reproductive technology in the prisons and is in no way a complete
analysis on the realities of each prison's financial position or population.
176. Percy v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 651 A.2d 1044, 1046 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(acknowledging that "[i]f female prisoners had the right to artificial insemination, the financial
burdens and security concerns would be quite significant inside the prison"); Mitchell-Leef, supra
note 172 (highlighting the process of female egg extraction).
177. Percy, 651 A.2d at 1046.
178. The number of single parent placements is slowly increasing, both in domestic and
international adoption settings. National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, Single Adoptive
Parents, at http://www.calib.com/naic/pubs/ssingle.htm (quoting W. Feigelman & A.R. Silverman,
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Additionally, the free-citizen spouse could participate in assisted
reproduction through commercial suppliers, thereby bypassing the internal
security and cost concerns associated with the prisoner participation. The
female spouse can purchase sperm from a sperm bank or, alternatively, a
male spouse could enter a genetic surrogacy contract.
In addition to the security and resource concerns, the state prison also
has a penological interest in assuring that there is some form of punishment,
deterrence, or retribution.18  That some fundamental rights are denied or
limited is part of the punishment and to allow every prisoner the right to
marry or procreate, either through conjugal visits or reproductive
technologies, is not a deterrent for other potential criminals or repeat
offenders, nor is it a form of retribution. These concerns should be balanced
with the idea that inmates who will never be released from prison will never
be able to fully participate in the joys of parenting or even knowing their
children and, thus, may receive an even harsher form of retribution.' 8'
However, there is also some evidence that some prisoners simply seek the
privilege of carrying on their genetic line or carrying a child to term. 82
C. The True Unfairness in the Battle of the Sexes: A New Penological
Interest
One of the penological objective arguments that the state prisons
routinely advance is the requirement that inmates be treated equally to the
extent possible. 183  When the Ninth Circuit assessed this penological
concern, it dismissed it as an invalid concern because it narrowly construed
the permission it was granting Gerber to mean that a male prisoner was
seeking to send his semen to a woman outside the prison system and not
seeking to accept such a sample himself.184 The court analogized the equal
Single Parent Adoption, in The Handbook for Single Adoptive Parents 123 (Chevy Chase, MD:
National Council for Single Adoptive Parents ed., 1993)).
179. 2001 I.R.S. Publ'n 968, Tax Benefitsfor Adoption, 2001 WL 1035731 (2001). There may be
societal policy concerns still associated with prisoners becoming parents while incarcerated. See
discussion infra Part V.A (on the stability of society).
180. DeOliveira, supra note 175, at 202 (stating that "certain fundamental rights should be denied
as part of the punishment itself").
181. Id. at 204 (noting that a prisoner may not be able to enjoy watching his or her child grow on a
daily basis).
182. Avis Thomas-Lester, Death Row Inmates Want to be Fathers; Prison Asked to Let Men
Preserve Sperm, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1991, at B1.
183. Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Goodwin as a comparison
case), vacated, reh 'g en banc granted, 273 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001).
184. Id.
treatment argument in a footnote, stating that a woman prisoner seeking the
same right would ask the prison to allow her to "donate an egg to her lesbian
partner or to a surrogate mother."' 85  Either way, female prisoners who
become pregnant or who seek egg extraction for the purposes of donating
such genetic material to another will inherently cost the state more
financially because of the different security concerns and medical attention
that such procedures require. 186  Thus, disallowing assisted reproductive
techniques in the penological setting is for the purpose of ensuring equal
accommodation to the female and male population of prisoners. This
explanation seems rational in light of the alternatives and the disparate
treatment among prisoners that would result if the restriction on procreation
did not exist or were modified to allow prisoners to send out their genetic
material. Additionally, if the courts allow procreation via artificial
insemination, then female inmates who are pregnant and on death row can
potentially stay their execution, thus, artificial insemination can affect their
ability to stay alive longer than male inmates. 117
There are possible alternatives to the current prison regulation that state
prisoners cannot participate in reproductive technologies. One alternative is
that all prisoners are allowed the opportunity to participate in procreative
opportunities. Another option is that the right to procreate is limited to only
those who are able to independently extract and send off genetic material. A
final alternative is that those who are able to finance reproductive
technologies on their own are given the freedom to do so. All of these
alternatives either move valuable prison resources away from necessary
prison programs, or create a disparate treatment between prisoners. In the
185. Id. at 891 n.13.
186. See DeOliveira, supra note 175, at 209 ("Pregnant prisoners require additional medical care,
modified facilities, and special diets."). Because there are additional procedures and practices
involved in caring for, and attending to, women's procreation needs and there is a growing female
population in the prison system, the end result of allowing females to participate in reproductive
technology is a significant increase in costs. Jessica Y. Kim, In-Prison Day Care: A Correctional
Alternative for Women Offenders, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 221, 222 (2001) (noting that the
number of women inmates increased 185% from 1980 to 1995). Also, in California, a government
regulation established a Family Foundations Program:
which is a 12-month residential substance abuse treatment program for pregnant and/or
parenting female inmates who have been determined... to benefit from
participation .... Female inmates in the program will be placed in a Family Foundations
facility in the community as an alternative to serving their prison term in a State prison
institution.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3074.3 (2002). Male prisoners do not enjoy this same opportunity if they
are expectant fathers.
187. Davis, supra note 53, at 190 n. 179. See Ellen Goodman, Prisoners of Love? Death Row
Inmates' Demands to Procreate Were Inevitable, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1992, at 4C (noting that if
female death row inmates could remain pregnant, they could feasibly stay their execution until
menopause); see also ARiZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4026 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57(1) (2001);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.31 (West 2002).
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end, the best result for ensuring that penological interests are preserved is to
prohibit all inmates from partaking in assisted reproductive technologies.
D. The Dividing Line
The fundamental right to procreate, which is guaranteed to free citizens,
should not be guaranteed to prisoners while incarcerated, especially when it
requires the assistance of reproductive technology. If the courts choose to
extend this right to prisoners while they are incarcerated, then the collective
burden on the prison resources, and increased security and administration,
should be a sufficient rationale for restricting that right. A dividing line
should at least be drawn at prohibiting prisoners with life term sentences
from procreating based on the concepts of "civil death," retribution,
deterrence, and as a compromise to observing the penological interests of
fairness to all prisoners.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Reproductive Technology and the Consequences of Granting This Right
to Prisoners on the Stability of Society
Because of the unique needs of the penitentiary system, the problems
and questions that arise from reproductive technology will vary from the
way in which we answer the same questions for free citizens. The questions
raised by Goodwin and Gerber, such as what is the impact on prisoners who
seek similar treatment; what are the safety concerns involved in the
procedure; and what is the government's responsibility-financial or
otherwise-to those who cannot afford to partake in these procreation
techniques, remain unresolved by the circuit courts. Other questions such
as, who is the parent if a male prisoner sends his sperm to a couple outside
the prison walls; what are the custody rights involved; and if such a
procreative right is denied, then what are the implications of the inability to
procreate on a person seeking to procure a divorce from an inmate, are yet to
be addressed.
Another area of concern in granting this right to prisoners is the
automatic creation of a single parent household. Although there is no law
against creating a single parent home, and it occurs regularly among free
citizens, 118 many reports have addressed the undesirable impact on society
and on children in these situations. 189 A committee created by the Attorney
General under President Regan submitted a report that stated:
"Intact families are good. Families who choose to have children are
making a desirable decision. Mothers and fathers who then decide
to spend a good deal of time raising those children themselves
rather than leaving it to others are demonstrably doing a good thing
for those children .... Public policy and the culture in general must
support and reaffirm these decisions-not undermine and be hostile
to them or send a message that we are neutral."
'1 90
Thus, research groups and commentators have concluded that dual
parent homes are in the better interest of our children and society and we
should seriously reflect on this public policy consideration when
determining the procreative rights of inmates.
When a prisoner leaves a family behind, the trend is that many families
fall into deep financial hardship if they were not already in poor financial
standing prior to the incarceration, and, thus, the family turns to state welfare
programs for assistance.'91 Essentially, if we allow prisoners the opportunity
to bring additional dependents into the world, then we are effectively
increasing the burden on state resources to provide for these children all
because one of their parents cannot, due to their own criminal decisions,
provide for them. What type of stability is there in the family unit when the
father or mother is in prison? Most children of inmates suffer greatly
because of the lack of foundation and financial stability. 192  "Inmates'
188. See 2000 United States Census Report, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrO-
8.pdf (illustrating that 28.3% (9.3% of 32.8% of families) of parents are raising their children alone);
see also Karen S. Peterson, Grandparents' Labor of Love, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 2001, at 1 D
(indicating that 42% of grandparents have primary responsibility for raising their grandkids).
189. "Fatherless children are at [a] dramatically greater risk of suicide." NATIONAL CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV, SURVEY ON CHILD HEALTH (1993);
see also Jean Beth Eshtain, Family Matters: The Plight of America's Children, CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, July 1993, at 14, 14-21 ("Three out of four teenage suicides occur in households where a
parent has been absent.").
190. Kay, supra note 134, at 2068-69 (quoting WHITE HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON THE FAMILY,
THE FAMILY: PRESERVING AMERICA'S FUTURE 6 (1986)).
191. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Welfare Reform Takes Money From Prisoners, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
23, 1999, at A6 (reporting that approximately 40,000 prisoners were still receiving their welfare
checks while in prison because they failed to terminate their benefits when they were convicted and
welfare checks are typically sent to an inmate's house rather than to the prison). This article reveals
that many prisoners come to jail already dependent on the state for basic support needs. See also
John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in
the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1998) (calculating the cost of incarceration and
explaining the effect of the increased welfare dependency of families of inmates).
192. Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, "It's a Family Affair"-The Incarceration of the
American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 271, 271-72 (1994).
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children are apt to experience behavioral problems due to lack of contact
with one of their parents, which often translates into future criminal
activity."'1 93 In all, it is not in the best interest of society or children to allow
prisoners the opportunity to create more children through assisted
reproductive technology because statistically those new children will suffer
great emotional and financial hardship at a great cost to the state.
If we do allow prisoners to become parents, how do we treat visitation
issues, and what is the impact of visitation on children? 194 In the case of a
California prisoner like Gerber, there is no privilege of family visits because
he is a life term prisoner.195 Furthermore, in the case of prisoners who are
serving shorter sentences, the factors weigh heavily against submitting
children to such an unfriendly environment. 196 There are arguments in favor
of visitation for the rehabilitative effect on prisoners.197 However, society's
primary concern should be for the innocent children and their health, well-
being, and state of mind, and there is more concern that "exposing a young
child to the truth about [their parent] might cause irreparable psychological
and emotional harm ... [and] visitation at a prison facility can be traumatic
and detrimental to a child."' 98 Why would we risk the harm?
B. Mental and Physical Health Concerns
Bringing children into the world from a prison setting also involves
complicated physical and mental health concerns because inmates are more
likely to contract a disease or illness that can be passed to the unborn child in
utero. 199 One district court calculated that inmates have "'a 1 in 200 chance
193. Id. at 272. "[Flamilies often become increasingly unstable[] and economically dependent on
the public assistance system." Id.
194. This discussion is limited to the realities of child visitation and the impact on the decision of
allowing procreation in the first instance. For a more thorough analysis see Rachel Sims, Can My
Daddy Hug Me?: Deciding Whether Visiting Dad in a Prison Facility Is in the Best Interest of the
Child, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 933 (2001).
195. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3174(e)(1-2) (2002) (prohibiting inmates who are convicted
of a violent crime involving a minor or family member, or committing any sex offense, or sentenced
to life or death, from participating in the privilege of family visits).
196. Sims, supra 194, at 947 (describing the atmosphere in most prisons as "unpleasant,
depressing, and sometimes frightening").
197. See Prisoners: Conjugal Visits: Hearing on S.B. 1382 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary,
1992 Leg., Regular Sess. (Cal. 1992) (statement in opposition) (claiming that "family visiting is an
incentive for positive prison behavior").
198. Sims, supra note 194, at 948.
199. Sexually transmitted diseases are common diseases that are passed in utero, causing illness
and complications, and they are also particularly prevalent in the prison population. See Silent
Voices, at http://www.silentvoices.org/std.html (explaining that pregnant women with chlamydia,
of contracting HIV during each year of [their] prison stay."' 200  The
importance of keeping sexually transmitted diseases contained, as well as
limiting the number of newborns who experience horrific illnesses because
of their parents' infections, is a valid policy rationale for restricting
reproductive rights of prisoners. In addition to suffering from sexually
transmitted diseases, many prisoners are battling substance abuse problems.
Babies born to mothers who struggle with addictions are extremely
vulnerable to being born with the same addictions.2 °' It is sad to consider
the various physical maladies that prisoners' babies are susceptible to
inheriting and the devastating impact such illnesses will have on a
newborn's chance for a healthy life.2 °2
Additionally, many prisoners suffer from some form of mental illness,
which is not a strong factor in favor of allowing a prisoner to bring a child
into the world, as many mental illness sufferers are deemed to be unfit
parents.2 °3 Courts have found that where parents suffer from mental illness,
they are deemed incompetent to raise a child.20 4 These holdings suggest that
in the case of prisons, where a high rate of mental illness is known, society
should be concerned with the effects of granting this population unlimited
procreation rights and opportunities.
C. Morally Repugnant
Several articles raise the prickly policy question of how to treat death
row inmates who seek to carry on their genetic line despite their marital
status and the crime for which they were committed to a death sentence.20 5
One inmate was quoted saying, "'[i]t is my constitutional right to have
children .... They have the legal right to kill me, but they have no right to
gonorrhea, or syphilis cause blindness, pneumonia, arthritis, heart disease, and other illnesses, or
even death, to their newborn babies); see also Ctr. for Aids Prevention Studies, Univ. of Cal., S.F.,
What Is the Role of Prisons in HIV, Hepatitis, STD and TB Prevention? (Aug. 2000), at
http://www.caps.ucsf.edu/inmaterev.html. Sexually transmitted diseases in the prison setting include
diseases such as syphilis, HIV, hepatitis, chlamydia, and gonorrhea. Id.
200. Hannah T.S. Long, The "Inequality" of Incarceration, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 321,
346 (quoting Myers v. Md. Div. of Corr., 782 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (D. Md. 1992)).
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174(1) (West 2001).
202. Id. § I I74(f).
203. Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to Communities: Political, Economic, and Social
Consequences, FED. PROBATION, June 2001, at 3, 4 (noting that a "recent survey revealed that nearly
one in five U.S. prisoners report having a mental illness").
204. In re Frederick P., 779 A.2d 957 (Me. 2001) (holding that a mother had a serious mental
health condition and terminating her parental rights).
205. Katherine Bishop, Death-Row Inmates Want Sperm Stored for Artificial Insemination,
MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 1992, at E6 (noting lawsuits in California and Virginia by death-row
inmates demanding the preservation of their sperm for artificial insemination); Thomas-Lester, supra
note 182, at BI.
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destroy my bloodline.' 20 6 There are countless inmates who have brutally
murdered innocent people or family members and now seek the opportunity
to create a new family.20 7 One inmate who was "convicted of killing his two
children in a custody dispute with his wife" now joins as a plaintiff in a
lawsuit asking the state to allow him to father another child. Isn't this the
ultimate conceit, to expect the state to allow you the opportunity to create a
new child after murdering your first child? Prisoners, particularly those
condemned to death, who assert the right to procreate have raised eyebrows
across the nation and have received little sympathy.
0 8
D. Possible Solutions
The prison population is growing,'09 and the question surrounding this
population's ability to procreate is of fundamental concern not only to the
penological institutions and their objectives, but also to our society and its
public policy foundations. The fundamental right granted to free citizens to
procreate naturally or via reproductive technologies should not accompany a
prisoner into the prison gates. Even if the Supreme Court concludes
pursuant to Turner's first prong analysis that prisoners have a fundamental
right to procreate, the Court should nevertheless give deference to the prison
in determining the impact on penological interests. Specifically, affording
this right to prisoners would cause too great of a strain to the penological
interests of security, resource allocation for high priority programs, and the
impact on true deterrence and retribution.
Additionally, in light of the great costs to society and the unborn
children of prisoners, prison administrators should consider withdrawing
conjugal visitation rights and any access to assisted reproduction techniques
from all prisoners regardless of their sentence and gender. This restriction
would have the same effect on all prisoners, except those sentenced to life,
because, unlike prisoners who will serve their sentence and then return
206. Thomas-Lester, supra note 182, at BI (quoting a death row inmate who claims he has a
constitutional right to preserve his sperm).
207. Richardson, supra note 47, at A3; see also Goodman, supra note 186, at 4C (describing one
plaintiff inmate as a man who "shot and killed an entire family" and another plaintiff as a man who
"killed his 10 and 4 year old nephews, after they saw him rape and try to kill their mother-[his
own] stepsister").
208. Goodman, supra note 187, at 4C (stating that such claims "ring[] a bit hollow"); see also
Richardson, supra note 47, at A3 (noting that the Virginia Governor was "'appalled by [the
plaintiff's] brazenness').
209. See the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics website at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/corr2tab.htm (graphing the growth in the prison
population from 319,598 in 1980 to 1,312,354 in 2000).
home, life term prisoners will never resume a life outside the prison walls. It
is essential that courts truly consider the difference between life term
prisoners and other inmates sentenced for shorter durations and consider the
interests involved in curtailing the former prisoners' rights. Courts have
already allowed regulations which limit marriage for prisoners who are
serving life sentences2 0 and also limit conjugal or family visits. 2 11  The
rationale in treating prisoners differently based on their sentencing stems
from the fact that the prison population is inherently more dangerous and
causes greater security concerns.212 On a national level, the prison
population increases.213 The statistics report that over half of the increase in
the prison population since 1990 is due to an increase in prisoners convicted
of violent offenses and that the number of prisoners on death row has been
increasing too.2 14 Because this growing population of dangerous felons has
existing restraints on its natural ability to procreate, courts will begin to face
more claims for the right to artificially inseminate.2 5 It is imperative that
courts mandate a precedent now and tell all inmates that prison is not the
place to start a family or to secure a genetic presence.
Rachel Michael Kirkley2 6
210. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974).
211. Anderson v. Vasquez, 827 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (denial of conjugal visits to death
row prisoners), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 92-16631, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17200 (9th Cir.
July 13, 1994).
212. Anderson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17200, at *3 (stating that condemned prisoners "pose
unique security problems").
213. See the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics website at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/keytabs.htm.
214. Id.
215. Egelko, supra note 1, at A-20. "In California, the [Gerber] case would apply mainly to life
prisoners-about one-sixth of the total of 159,000 inmates-because nearly all others are allowed
conjugal visits under state regulations." Id. The number of prisoners under a sentence of death
nationally in 2000 was 3,593. See the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics
website at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/keytabs.htm.
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